The contribution of this research lies in its dual approach to the question of physical activity (PA) among adolescents, combining objective measurement of PA by teenagers and a comparison of psychological satisfaction through physical activities involving differing degrees of autonomy (i.e., organized or unstructured). Using the conceptual framework of Self-Determination Theory, the analysis also examines the relationship between levels of PA among adolescents and physical self-concept and satisfaction of basic psychological needs during exercise. The study surveyed 129 first-year higher secondary (...) education students from schools in the city of A Coruña. Satisfaction of basic psychological needs during organized and unstructured physical activities was measured using the Basic Psychological Needs in Exercise Scale. PA levels were assessed based on step count per day for a week as measured by an accelerometer. The results show that the daily step average recorded by students (7,400) is below the minimum recommended levels of PA for this age group, that students are more active on weekdays than at the weekend, and that there is no significant difference in PA levels between male and female subjects ( T = 0.23, p d = 0.04). Findings from the comparative analysis of the three basic psychological needs show greater satisfaction of the need for autonomy during unstructured activities ( T = 6.15, p d = 0.68), and greater satisfaction of the need for competence during organized activities ( T = −2.50, p d = 0.27). No variation in terms of sex was found in relation to satisfaction of the need for autonomy or relatedness from unstructured activities; however, girls showed notably lower satisfaction than boys in relation to the need for competence ( T = −2.62, p d = 0.49). Self-esteem was found to play an important mediating role and observed to be strongly related to sex ( T = −5.16, p d = 0.90). Organized PA was found to provide greater need satisfaction among boys than girls across all categories. The study showed no relationship between psychological variables and objectively measured PA (Pillai’s trace: F = 0.86, p > 0.05, η 2 = 0.08, observed power = 0.66). Basic psychological needs show significant positive interrelation between them and a significant positive relationship between them and physical self-concept, as expected based on previous literature. (shrink)

The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much-discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent `wholesale' arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists (...) and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential objections to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling of ennui afflicting contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

We locate winning strategies for various ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}$ -games in the L-hierarchy in order to prove the following: Theorem 1. KP+Σ₂-Comprehension $\vdash \exists \alpha L_{\alpha}\ models"\Sigma _{2}-{\bf KP}+\Sigma _{3}^{0}-\text{Determinacy}."$ Alternatively: ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ "there is a β-model of ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}+\text{\hspace{0.17 em}}{\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}$ -Determinacy." The implication is not reversible. (The antecedent here may be replaced with ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\text{\hspace{0.17em}}\left({\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}\right)-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}:\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}$ instances of Comprehension with only ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}$ -lightface definable parameters—or even weaker theories.) Theorem 2. KP +Δ₂-Comprehension +Σ₂-Replacement + ${\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ -Determinacy. (Here AQI (...) is the assertion that every arithmetical quasi-inductive definition converges.) Alternatively: $\Delta _{3}^{1}{\rm CA}_{0}+{\rm AQI}\nvdash \Sigma _{3}^{0}$ -Determinacy. Hence the theories: ${\mathrm{\Pi }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0},\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}+\text{\hspace{0.17em}}{\mathrm{\Sigma }}_{3}^{0}-\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ -Det, ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}+\mathrm{A}\mathrm{Q}\mathrm{I}$ , and ${\mathrm{\Delta }}_{3}^{1}-{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{A}}_{0}\phantom{\rule{0ex}{0ex}}$ are in strictly descending order of strength. (shrink)

Many enhancement technologies are distributed by healthcare professionals—by physicians—who are held to the Hippocratic Oath and the goals of medicine. While the ethics of enhancement has been widely discussed with regard to the social justice, humanism, morals and normative values of these interventions, their place in medicine has not attracted a great deal of attention. This paper investigates the potential for enhancement technologies to fulfil the goals of medicine, arguing that they play a role in promoting the health of individuals, (...) and thus, an unavoidable place in medicine. It also warns of potential dangers, suggesting a set of guidelines to initiate conversations regarding the role and responsibilities of physicians practising in an era of enhancement. (shrink)

The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is taken to show that values are inevitably involved in making judgements or forming beliefs. After reviewing this conclusion, I pose cases which are prima facie counterexamples: the unreflective application of conventions, use of black-boxed instruments, reliance on opaque algorithms, and unskilled observation reports. These cases are counterexamples to the AIR posed in ethical terms as a matter of personal values. Nevertheless, it need not be understood in those terms. The values which load a (...) theory choice may be those of institutions or past actors. This means that the challenge of responsibly handling inductive risk is not merely an ethical issue, but is also social, political, and historical. (shrink)

Leerboek voor studenten aan de pedagogische academie en de opleiding voor kleuterleidsters, geschreven vanuit protestants christelijke achtergrond.

Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to scientific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic Induction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Contra Anjan Chakravartty’s suggestion that the NI is a ‘red herring’, I argue that it reveals something deep and important about science. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, which lies at the heart of the NI, yields a richer anti-realism than the PI. It explains why science falls short when it falls short, and (...) so it might figure in the most coherent account of scientific practice. However, this best account will be antirealist in some respects and about some theories. It will not be a sweeping antirealism about all or most of science. (shrink)

We consider a question of Pereira as to whether the characteristic function of an internally approachable model can lead to free subsets for functions of the model. Pereira isolated the pertinent Approachable Free Subsets Property (AFSP) in his work on the $${\text {pcf}}$$ pcf -conjecture. A recent related property is the Approachable Bounded Subset Property (ABSP) of Ben-Neria and Adolf, and we here directly show it requires modest large cardinals to establish:TheoremIf ABSP holds for an ascending sequence $$ \langle \aleph (...) _{n_{m}} \rangle _{m}$$ ⟨ ℵ n m ⟩ m $$( n_{m} \in \omega )$$ ( n m ∈ ω ) then there is an inner model with measurables $$\kappa < \aleph _{\omega }$$ κ < ℵ ω of arbitrarily large Mitchell order below $$\aleph _{\omega }$$ ℵ ω, that is: $$\sup \left\{ \alpha \mid {\exists }\kappa < \aleph _{\omega } o ( \kappa ) \ge \alpha \right\} = \aleph _{\omega }$$ sup α ∣ ∃ κ < ℵ ω o ( κ ) ≥ α = ℵ ω. A result of Adolf and Ben Neria then shows that this conclusion is in fact the exact consistency strength of ABSP for such an ascending sequence. Their result went via the consistency of the non-existence of continuous tree-like scales; the result of this paper is direct and avoids the use of PCF scales. (shrink)

We show how in the hierarchies${F_\alpha }$of Fieldian truth sets, and Herzberger’s${H_\alpha }$revision sequence starting from any hypothesis for${F_0}$ that essentially each${H_\alpha }$ carries within it a history of the whole prior revision process.As applications we provide a precise representation for, and a calculation of the length of, possiblepath independent determinateness hierarchiesof Field’s construction with a binary conditional operator. We demonstrate the existence of generalized liar sentences, that can be considered as diagonalizing past the determinateness hierarchies definable in Field’s recent (...) models. The ‘defectiveness’ of such diagonal sentences necessarily cannot be classified by any of the determinateness predicates of the model. They are ‘ineffable liars’. We may consider them a response to the claim of Field that ‘the conditional can be used to show that the theory is not subject to “revenge problems”.’. (shrink)

These are details of research conducted in November and December 2007. The file is meant as a supplement to publication, and I have not attempted here to provide any analysis of the results.

The Alagadd?pama Sutta is the 22nd discourse of the Majjhima-nik?ya of the Pali canon. In the sutta itself it is mentioned that the Buddha’s delivery of this discourse was necessitated by the need to refute a wrong view held by one of his disciples named Ari??ha. Parallel versions of the sutta are found preserved in the Chinese?gamas. The two main similes used in the sutta, those of the snake and of the raft, are referred to in the scriptures of a (...) number of non-Therav?da Buddhist traditions as well, showing that the Buddhist doctrine represented in it is early and authentic and the message contained in the sutta was considered to be extremely significant by many early Buddhist traditions. The Alagadd?pama Sutta shows the Buddha’s role as one of the earliest thinkers in the history of philosophy who engaged in a critique of the craving for metaphysics and dogma frequently exhibited in those who propound worldviews. The Buddha did not value a belief or a worldview on grounds of the logical skill with which it was constructed but on grounds of the transformative effect it could have on the character of an individual and the sense of wellbeing it could promote. There are several discourses of the Pali canon which give prominence to this aspect of the Buddha’s teaching. Among them the Brahmaj?la Sutta of the D?gha-nik?ya and the A??hakavagga of the Suttanip?ta need special mention. The Buddha is seen to have consistently avoided engagement in speculative metaphysics, pointing out that the goal of his teaching goes beyond all such engagement. The Buddha himself distinguished his own worldview as a Teaching in the Middle avoiding the common tendency of humankind to be trapped by either of the two extremes, Eternalism or Annihilationism. These distinctive standpoints of the Buddha are all seen to be amply represented in the Alagadd?pama Sutta. (shrink)

Cover songs are a familiar feature of contemporary popular music. Musicians describe their own performances as covers, and audiences use the category to organize their listening and appreciation. However, until now philosophers have not had much to say about them. This book explores how to think about covers, appreciating covers, and the metaphysics of covers and songs. Along the way, it explores a range of issues raised by covers, from the question of what precisely constitutes a cover, to the history (...) and taxonomy of the category, the various relationships that hold between songs, performances, and tracks, and the appreciation and evaluation of covers. (shrink)

Some philosophers understand natural kinds to be the categories which are constraints on enquiry. In order to elaborate the metaphysics appropriate to such an account, I consider the complicated history of scurvy, citrus, and vitamin C. It may be tempting to understand these categories in a shallow way (as mere property clusters) or in a deep way (as fundamental properties). Neither approach is adequate, and the case instead calls for middle-range ontology: starting from categories which we identify in the world (...) and elaborating their structure, but not pretending to jump ahead to a complete story about fundamental being. (shrink)

There are two ways that we might respond to the underdetermination of theory by data. One response, which we can call the agnostic response, is to suspend judgment: "Where scientific standards cannot guide us, we should believe nothing". Another response, which we can call the fideist response, is to believe whatever we would like to believe: "If science cannot speak to the question, then we may believe anything without science ever contradicting us". C.S. Peirce recognized these options and suggested evading (...) the dilemma. It is a Logical Maxim, he suggests, that there could be no genuine underdetermination. This is no longer a viable option in the wake of developments in modern physics, so we must face the dilemma head on. The agnostic and fideist responses to underdetermination represent fundamentally different epistemic viewpoints. Nevertheless, the choice between them is not an unresolvable struggle between incommensurable worldviews. There are legitimate considerations tugging in each direction. Given the balance of these considerations, there should be a modest presumption of agnosticism. This may conflict with Peirce's Logical Maxim, but it preserves all that we can preserve of the Peircean motivation. (shrink)

In the axiomatic development of the logic of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics it is not difficult to set down certain plausible axioms which ensure that the quantum logic of propositions has the structure of an orthomodular poset. This can be done in a number of ways, for example, as in Gunson [2], Mackey [4], Piron [5], Varadarajan [7] and Zierler [8], and we summarise one of these ways in §2 below.

We discuss some of the relationships between the notion of "mutual stationarity" of Foreman and Magidor and measurability in inner models. The general thrust of these is that very general mutual stationarity properties on small cardinals, such as the ℵns, is a large cardinal property. A number of open problems, theorems, and conjectures are stated.

According to many philosophers, psychological explanation canlegitimately be given in terms of belief and desire, but not in termsof knowledge. To explain why someone does what they do (so the common wisdom holds) you can appeal to what they think or what they want, but not what they know. Timothy Williamson has recently argued against this view. Knowledge, Williamson insists, plays an essential role in ordinary psychological explanation.Williamson's argument works on two fronts.First, he argues against the claim that, unlike knowledge, (...) belief is``composite'' (representable as a conjunction of a narrow and a broadcondition). Belief's failure to be composite, Williamson thinks, undermines the usual motivations for psychological explanation in terms of belief rather than knowledge.Unfortunately, we claim, the motivations Williamson argues against donot depend on the claim that belief is composite, so what he saysleaves the case for a psychology of belief unscathed.Second, Williamson argues that knowledge can sometimes provide abetter explanation of action than belief can.We argue that, in the cases considered, explanations that cite beliefs(but not knowledge) are no less successful than explanations that citeknowledge. Thus, we conclude that Williamson's arguments fail both coming andgoing: they fail to undermine a psychology of belief, and they fail tomotivate a psychology of knowledge. (shrink)

Although some authors hold that natural kinds are necessarily relative to disciplinary domains, many authors presume that natural kinds must be absolute, categorical features of the reality —often assuming that without even mentioning the alternative. Recognizing both possibilities, one may ask whether the difference especially matters. I argue that it does. Looking at recent arguments about natural kind realism, I argue that we can best make sense of the realism question by thinking of natural kindness as a relation that holds (...) between a category and a domain. (shrink)

William James’ argument against William Clifford in The Will to Believe is often understood in terms of doxastic efficacy, the power of belief to influence an outcome. Although that is one strand of James’ argument, there is another which is driven by ampliative risk. The second strand of James’ argument, when applied to scientific cases, is tantamount to what is now called the Argument from Inductive Risk. Either strand of James’ argument is sufficient to rebut Clifford's strong evidentialism and show (...) that it is sometimes permissible to believe in the absence of compelling evidence. However, the two considerations have different scope and force. Doxastic efficacy applies in only some cases but allows any values to play a role in determining belief; risk applies in all cases but only allows particular conditional values to play a role. (shrink)

In late 2014, the jazz combo Mostly Other People Do the Killing released Blue—an album that is a note-for-note remake of Miles Davis's 1959 landmark album Kind of Blue. This is a thought experiment made concrete, raising metaphysical puzzles familiar from discussion of indiscernible counterparts. It is an actual album, rather than merely a concept, and so poses the aesthetic puzzle of why one would ever actually listen to it.

This discussion note addresses Caleb Hazelwood’s ‘Practice-Centered Pluralism and a Disjunctive Theory of Art’. Hazelwood advances a disjunctive definition of art on the basis of an analogy with species concept pluralism in the philosophy of biology. We recognize the analogy between species and art, we applaud attention to practice, and we are bullish on pluralism—but it is a mistake to take these as the basis for a disjunctive definition.

If two theory formulations are merely different expressions of the same theory, then any problem of choosing between them cannot be due to the underdetermination of theories by data. So one might suspect that we need to be able to tell distinct theories from mere alternate formulations before we can say anything substantive about underdetermination, that we need to solve the problem of identical rivals before addressing the problem of underdetermination. Here I consider two possible solutions: Quine proposes that we (...) call two theories identical if they are equivalent under a reconstrual of predicates, but this would mishandle important cases. Another proposal is to defer to the particular judgements of actual scientists. Consideration of an historical episodethe alleged equivalence of wave and matrix mechanicsshows that this second proposal also fails. Nevertheless, I suggest, the original suspicion is wrong; there are ways to enquire into underdetermination without having solved the problem of identical rivals. (shrink)

There is a history of thinking that photographs provide a special kind of access to the objects depicted in them, beyond the access that would be provided by a painting or drawing. What is included in the photograph does not depend on the photographer’s beliefs about what is in front of the camera. This feature leads Kendall Walton to argue that photographs literally allow us to see the objects which appear in them. Current generative algorithms produce images in response to (...) users’ text prompts. Depending on the parameters, the output can resemble specific people or things which are named in the prompt. This resemblance does not depend on the user’s beliefs, so generated images are in this sense like photographs. Given this parallel, how should we think about AI-generated images? (shrink)

John Anthony Crook, a Fellow of the British Academy, was a distinguished ancient historian with a special interest in Roman history and law. Among historians, his knowledge and understanding of Roman law was unequalled. Crook's academic career was spent for the most part in the University of Cambridge, and at St John's College. He entered the college as an undergraduate in 1939, and served as a Fellow from 1951 until his death on September 7, 2007. Within the Faculty of Classics (...) he rose to be Professor of ancient history in 1979. Crook was born in Balham, London, the only child of a bandsman in the Grenadier Guards. In his book Law and Life of Rome, he gave a brilliant demonstration of how legal sources might be made accessible and used constructively for social history. In the late 1970s, Crook joined forces with J. G. Wolf to produce an edition of the Murecine Tablets, to which they had been drawn independently. (shrink)

Wikipedia is a free encyclopedia that is written and edited entirely by visitors to its website. I argue that we are misled when we think of it in the same epistemic category with traditional general encyclopedias. An empirical assessment of its reliability reveals that it varies widely from topic to topic. So any particular claim found in it cannot be relied on based on its source. I survey some methods that we use in assessing specific claims and argue that the (...) structure of the Wikipedia frustrates them. (shrink)

Peter Baumann offers the tantalizing suggestion that Thomas Reid is almost, but not quite, a pragmatist. He motivates this claim by posing a dilemma for common sense philosophy: Will it be dogmatism or scepticism? Baumann claims that Reid points to but does not embrace a pragmatist third way between these unsavory options. If we understand `pragmatism' differently than Baumann does, however, we need not be so equivocal in attributing it to Reid. Reid makes what we could call an argument from (...) practical commitment, and this is plausibly an instance of what William James calls the pragmatic method. (shrink)

P D Walsh; Value Education in a Pluralist Society, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 24–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.

Biblical authority is definitive for many Protestants in matters of faith and practice. The question this essay addresses is the deafening silence of this Scriptural authority on the controversial issue of abortion, especially because Christian scholars have argued vehemently against this practice. In particular, Michael Gorman's recent article ‘Why is the New Testament silent about abortion?’ raises many substantive issues with implications for the very meaning of authority, faith, and the life of the community. It is contended that elective abortion (...) poses significant substantive issues with which a woman, or couple, must struggle, and that it is inappropriate (perhaps unfaithful) to make such a profound decision according to unfeeling or out-modeled patriarchal rules. (shrink)